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SUMMARY 
 
Options for government’s future climate policy are discussed as a function of 
the architecture of the present regime; the latter is anchored in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which is aimed at reducing the human impact on climate change. 
We describe the basic tenets of this agreement, and explain how it was 
realised despite the widely divergent interests. The strengths and weaknesses 
of the Kyoto regime, and related future opportunities and threats, are 
presented. The degrees of collective decision-making and international 
participation were the basis for exploring four scenarios (local market, local 
collectivity, global market, and global collectivity) and concomitant policy 
instruments and actors. The possibilities of enhancing participation by 
linking issues and creating bandwagons are discussed. We conclude that the 
main flaw of the Kyoto regime is its lack of appropriate incentives. To realise 
a more effective regime, future climate policy should be geared towards 
making participation more attractive and rendering compliance self-
enforcing.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Kyoto Protocol, concluded in December 1997 to address anthropogenic 
(i.e., human-induced) climate change, is undoubtedly the most prominent 
global environmental agreement. This status stems from the perception that 
climate change represents a major environmental problem without easy 
solutions, the high stakes involved for many parties, the controversial nature 
of the agreement, and the media coverage it has received.2 While many 
uncertainties persist, increasing scientific evidence points to a large human 
influence on global atmospheric conditions.3 This human impact is caused 
mainly by the combustion of fossil fuels, which gives rise to greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) that retain solar radiation, causing both progressive warming 
of the atmosphere4 and the increased occurrence of extreme weather events. 
These changes may have far-reaching consequences: the progressive 
flooding or desertification of large areas, the melting of glaciers and ice caps, 
major shifts in patterns and levels of economic activities, and the 
disappearance of a significant number of living species. The possible 
consequences of climate change (including the disappearance of small island 
states) are thus enormous, as is the impact of addressing the causes. Many 
constituencies have important interests in the production, marketing, and use 
of derivatives of fossil fuels (oil, gas, and coal). Mitigating the human impact 
on climate would directly affect the financial resources of countries and 
companies in this business. Besides, most states and economic actors would 
be concerned indirectly, since a large share of economic activities are 
supported by fossil-fuel-generated energy. As a result, major changes of 
production and consumption practices would be required globally.  
A major impediment to action has been the global-public-good nature of 
the climate issue: GHG emissions from anywhere on earth contribute to the 
global problem, while parties taking action enjoy only a small share of the 
fruits.5 This misfit between loci of costs and benefits has given rise to free-
rider behaviour (i.e., a calculative abstention from collective action out of 
personal interest), reinforced by time lags between efforts and results: future 
generations bear the consequences of present (in)action. Another 
complicating factor has been the North-South divide: low-income countries 
have not committed themselves to action, arguing that rich nations are 
responsible for most of the problems and should thus take the lead. 
                                                 
2 Grubb et al., 1999; Oberthür and Ott, 1999. 
3 IPCC, 1995, 2001. 
4 This does not imply, however, that the temperature rises around the globe. Owing to changes in 
gulf streams, certain regions may actually be confronted with lower temperatures (Bartsch et al., 
2000; Oberthür and Ott, 1999).  
5 Kaul et al., 1999. 
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Consequently, the Protocol, which ensues from negotiations between parties 
with divergent interests, has also been controversial in nature. Finally, 
regular public attention has been drawn for over a decade by the media 
coverage of the climate negotiations. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol has 
become better known among the public at large than any other environmental 
agreement.  
Thousands of persons have been involved – directly and indirectly – in 
Kyoto’s lengthy antecedents, laborious conclusion, and capricious aftermath: 
negotiators from virtually all countries, climate scientists, business lobbyists, 
environmental activists, and media representatives. Myriads of publications 
on the Kyoto Protocol have seen the light. The object of this study was not to 
reiterate the factual evolution of global climate policy or to provide an in-
depth description of Kyoto’s provisions and mechanisms; these have been 
excellently explained elsewhere.6 The aim of this study was twofold. First, to 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the climate policy regime that has 
emerged over the past few decades against the objective of sharply reducing 
the human impact on climate. Second, to explore the opportunities and 
threats of future climate policy given the prevailing regime – the idea being 
that if the present is a reflection of past developments, a future climate 
regime is shaped to an important extent by the present architecture.7 The 
Kyoto Protocol has remained for years in a critical stage, with all options 
(entry-into-force, collapse, and renegotiation) still open.  
 
While drawing on different theoretical strands, we made predominant use of 
insights from regime theory8 and institutional theory.9 Regimes are ‘sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations’.10 They are constituted by factors such as the interests and 
influences of different parties, common norms, established customs, and 
generated and shared knowledge. Effective regimes contribute to putting 
interconnected (environmental) problems higher on the political agenda, 
addressing (global) problems in a more comprehensive way, and formulating 
national policy responses. The regime approach has different (economic, 
legal, political, normative) dimensions, though political aspects tend to 
                                                 
6 Bartsch et al., 2000; Depledge, 2000; Grubb et al., 1999; Oberthür and Ott, 1999. 
7 This is not to say that a future regime is fully determined by the present conditions, as it is also 
influenced by other factors, in particular the future political willingness to act. 
8 Haas et al., 1993; Keohane and Nye, 2001; Krasner, 1983; Young, 1994, 1999. 
9 DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Phillips et al., 2000; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1996. 
10 Krasner, 1983: 2. While regime theory applies primarily to international relations, it can easily 
be extended to the national context – for example, to explain group processes that cannot be 
legally enforced. 
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dominate. Therefore, regime theory provides a suitable lens to conceptualise 
the (global) interplay of forces, ambitions, and insights in relation to the 
climate-change issue. Institutional theory shows significant overlap with 
regime theory, though it focuses more on explaining the behaviour of 
(groups of) individuals and organisations. Institutions can be defined as 
‘enforced rules, formal and informal, about what actions are required, 
prohibited, or permitted’.11 They constitute the basis for institutionalisation, 
which is ‘a core process in the creation and perpetuation of enduring social 
groups’.12 
 Empirical insights were obtained through interviews and an expert panel. 
Between May and December 2003, in-depth interviews were conducted with 
30 representatives of (national and supranational) government, business, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and academia in Europe and North 
America who had all been directly or indirectly involved in the Kyoto 
process. Respondents were asked about their roles, the relative importance of 
(domestic and international) actors, the realisation of the Kyoto Protocol, its 
(de)merits, and its prospects. Most interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed; detailed notes were taken of the rest. The transcripts, notes, and 
recent newspaper excerpts were coded in Atlas/ti, a qualitative software 
package.13 In December 2003, a one-day workshop was attended by 20 
experts from government, business, and academia. Brainstorm-and-analysis 
sessions were held on the present and possible future climate regimes. Salient 
insights from this workshop were represented in a detailed report.14 The 
coded excerpts and the workshop report were subsequently analysed.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the second section, dealing 
with the past and the present, we indicate the basic tenets of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Factors explaining the ‘success’ of Kyoto are then highlighted,15 
followed by a description of developments since the agreement was 
concluded. These lead to an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Kyoto regime. They constitute inputs for the third section, which focuses 
on future climate policy. We explore four possible climate policy scenarios, 
and for each scenario discuss policy instruments and the actors involved. 
Next, the possibilities of creating participation leverage are indicated. In the 
                                                 
11 Prakash, 2000: 17. 
12 Tolbert and Zucker, 1996: 180. 
13 Codes capture and bundle highlighted chunks of text around specific themes (such as 
‘strengths of Kyoto’ or ‘relative importance of stakeholders’), facilitating the subsequent 
analysis of these themes. See Weitzman and Miles (1995) for a description of the analytical 
possibilities of Atlas/ti. 
14 Wijen and Zoeteman, 2004. 
15 The ‘success’ refers to getting all parties to sign the Kyoto Protocol; it does not refer to its 
ratification or entry-into-force. 
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final section, we draw conclusions on the opportunities and threats of future 
public climate policy. 
 
 
KYOTO’S ARCHITECTURE16 
 
Kyoto’s organisational embedding and substantive arrangements, such as 
agreed prior to and during the Protocol’s conclusion and further elaborated 
during subsequent meetings, are described in this section. The contents were 
analysed against the backdrop of the different interests, and the regime’s 
(de)merits were examined. 
 
Institutions 
 
An international group of climate scientists, which has participated from 
1988 onwards in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
has applied major resources to investigating the human impact on climate, as 
well as the socio-economic consequences of climate change. 
Notwithstanding the complexity of the causal chains of evidence and the 
uncertainty of future developments, the IPCC has increasingly come to the 
conclusion that the human impact on atmospheric GHG concentrations is 
significant and that the consequences of climate change are far-reaching.17  
As a result of the growing scientific evidence of the human impact, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This Convention was aimed at stabilising 
GHG concentrations at levels that are compatible with present and future 
socio-economic development, thus preventing dangerous human interference 
with the climate system. Guiding principles were also formulated: common 
but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, implying that while the 
same objective is pursued, individual actors assume actions according to 
their (financial and institutional) carrying capacity. A related principle 
referred to consideration of the vulnerable position of developing countries. 
Consequently, developed countries (‘Annex I Parties’) committed themselves 
to adopting adequate national measures. The UNFCCC was endowed with a 
Secretariat, established in Bonn, to coordinate and file the positions of 
different nations and monitor their actions. The Secretariat explored possible 
common grounds between states in a neutral way, thus facilitating Kyoto’s 
                                                 
16 Unless indicated otherwise, factual information in this section draws on: Barrett, 1998; Bartsch 
et al., 2000; Grubb et al., 1999; Gupta, 2001; McGivern, 1998; Oberthür and Ott, 1999; Yamin, 
1998. The design of the Kyoto Protocol was inspired by the successful Montreal Protocol, 
concluded in 1987, on the ban of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (Barrett, 2003). 
17 IPCC, 1995, 2001. 
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preparatory negotiations, such as the annually revolving Conferences of the 
Parties (COPs).  
The IPCC’s findings greatly facilitated the conclusion of the Kyoto 
Protocol. After 1997, the IPCC continued to provide scientific evidence. The 
UNFCCC constitutes the political and legal infrastructure of the Protocol, 
with an active Secretariat in charge of its implementation. 
 
Targets and Mechanisms 
 
The overall target of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce human-induced GHG 
concentrations by an average of 5.2 per cent over the period 2008-2012 
(‘first commitment period’), as compared with the base year, 1990.18 The net 
greenhouse impact is targeted: the emissions of a basket of six GHGs (of 
which carbon dioxide is, in absolute terms, by far the most important)19 
minus the absorption of these gases by ‘sinks’ (mainly additional forests). In 
line with the principle of differentiated responsibilities, developed nation 
states committed themselves to individualised targets, ranging from a 28 per 
cent reduction to a 27 per cent increase.20 No emission ceilings were 
formulated for developing countries. The height of national targets was 
determined on the basis of past emission records (with high past levels, both 
in absolute and relative terms, entailing more stringent targets) and 
negotiation power (with large and indispensable parties obtaining modest 
marks).21 
While it has formulated precise targets and timetables, the Kyoto regime 
does not prescribe any policies and measures (PAMs). This implies that 
nation states have the discretion to choose domestic implementation modes. 
Yet, the Protocol provides international compliance options. Parties which 
exceed their emission caps may buy off the difference from countries which 
have unexploited emission room (‘hot air’). By creating a market for GHG 
emission credits (‘carbon trade’), the Protocol has caused GHGs to be 
monetarised for the first time. Joint Implementation (JI) is another 
                                                 
18 It is generally recognised that this target is insufficient to achieve the Climate Convention’s 
objective, which would necessitate more than halving anthropogenic GHG emissions (Metz and 
Berk, 2001; Oberthür and Ott, 1999). At the same time, unaltered practices (‘business-as-usual’) 
would entail double-digit increases (Löschel and Zhang, 2002; McGivern, 1998). 
19 Carbon dioxide accounts for 82 per cent of GHG emissions in industrialised countries. The 
other regulated gases are methane (12 per cent of emissions), nitrous oxide (4 per cent), and three 
halocarbons (2 per cent). 
20 Several Northern European countries agreed upon relatively large emission-reduction targets, 
while several Southern European states were entitled to the largest relative increases, following 
an internal EU ‘bubble’ agreement. 
21 An example of a large and indispensable party is Russia, which succeeded in negotiating 
stabilisation, although its economic collapse and production inefficiency would have justified a 
major reduction of its GHG emissions. 
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international compliance mechanism. Countries meet their national 
commitments by paying for (the additional costs of) emission-reduction 
measures implemented in other Annex I countries. A similar tool is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), where (subjects of) states invest in 
project-based reduction measures in developing countries. The Kyoto 
Protocol has no financial provisions for implementation in the sense of 
redistributing funds, apart from some assistance to developing countries 
(through the Global Environment Fund, GEF). 
The Protocol is thus flexible as to the gases targeted (trade-offs among 
GHGs are allowed), the nature of measures (technical or accounting 
solutions), and the locus of implementation (domestically or abroad). It is 
also flexible as to timing: excess emissions in a particular year may be 
compensated afterwards, as only the cumulative emission record by 2008-
2012 counts, while unused assigned quantities may be saved for future 
periods (‘banking’). Non-complying parties must assume a 30 per cent 
reduction surcharge in the next commitment period. There are no direct 
financial sanctions or other enforcement mechanisms, as is the case with 
most international agreements. 
 
Realisation  
 
While realising a global agreement, involving numerous parties, on a public 
good with uncertain, long-term consequences is a major enterprise, the task 
becomes even more arduous when conflicting interests exist. Some parties 
(like producers of fossil fuels and cold-climate states) had articulated 
interests in thwarting the realisation of such a climate agreement; indeed, 
they actively resisted through the Global Climate Coalition.22 It is a wonder 
that agreement was finally reached in Kyoto among all nation states involved 
in the negotiations.  
A major reason for Kyoto’s ‘success’ is that the Protocol consists of 
elements that are crucial to the different parties and/or that do not contain 
stipulations against which they have prohibitive objections. No party is 
completely satisfied with the present, heavily compromised agreement, but it 
perfectly reflects the different interests defended by blocks of negotiating 
countries. The European Union (EU) obtained firm targets and timetables, 
but had to give in with respect to its desired prescription of PAMs. The 
United States (US) succeeded in imposing market-like instruments and sinks 
as well as in avoiding PAMs, but had to compromise on the involvement of 
developing countries. Japan, which had mostly negotiated on the side of the 
US and other major non-EU industrialised countries (united in the 
                                                 
22 Levy and Egan, 2003. 
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‘JUSSCANNZ coalition’ and the similar ‘Umbrella group’),23 benefited from 
the honour of having a prestigious agreement concluded on its territory, but 
had to assume an emission-reduction commitment despite the relatively high 
energy efficiency of its economy. Other advanced industrialised countries 
succeeded in avoiding high emission-reduction targets, but had to accept 
emission ceilings. Eastern European countries and Russia, whose GHG 
emissions had dramatically dropped during the 1990s, also had to show 
political commitment, but had the prospect of political benefit (from 
improved relations with the EU and US) and financial pay-off (from selling 
hot air). The developing countries, which had joined forces in the G77,24 
managed to avoid any binding commitments, but had to demonstrate moral 
engagement and accept that industrialised countries obtained modest targets 
and could avoid domestic action through international mechanisms. 
Common factors also drove the Protocol’s realisation. The threat of 
human disasters and economic disruptions, induced by progressive warming 
and extreme weather events, were also a major explanation of Kyoto’s 
realisation. An increased incidence of death from heat (virtually all warm 
summers at higher latitudes of the last two centuries have occurred since 
1980), the exponential rise in damage from weather-related catastrophes over 
the last forty years, and even the outright disappearance of (parts of) low-
lying countries highlight the necessity to act.25 The IPCC’s mounting 
evidence of human influence on climate, as well as indications of 
consequences of climate changes, had significantly raised this awareness.  
The pressure to reach an agreement was also upheld by the media. 
Environmental NGOs, coordinating actions through the Climate Action 
Network (CAN), succeeded in securing ample media attention. No party 
wanted to become the public scapegoat of a mediatised negotiation failure; 
the propensity to compromise was thus enhanced. The willingness to assume 
dissimilar but ‘fair’ shares of the reduction burden was increased by 
scientific calculations of national and sectoral contributions to GHG 
concentrations. For example, the EU’s burden-sharing agreement was 
underpinned by calculations of relative contributions, thus turning a political 
polemic into a scientific debate.26 Finally, Kyoto’s chair, Raúl Estrada-
                                                 
23 The JUSSCANNZ coalition consisted of Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, 
Norway, and New Zealand, countries which for different reasons opposed a stringent climate 
regime. The Umbrella group was made up of the JUSSCANNZ countries except for Switzerland, 
together with Russia and Ukraine. 
24 The G77 is a group of over a hundred developing countries, negotiating as a solid block 
despite internal differences. For example, the OPEC nations wanted to avoid any significant 
actions because of their fossil-fuel interests, while the AOSIS (Association of Small Island 
States) countries advocated important actions because their survival was at stake owing to rising 
sea levels. 
25 Holdren, 2003.  
26 Phylipsen et al., 1998. 
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Oyuela, skilfully exploited the potential common grounds and hammered out 
a success where failure was imminent.  
 
State of Affairs 
 
By the year 2000, the aggregate level of net GHG emissions in Annex I 
countries was fairly well in line with the agreed target.27 Major contributions 
to this relatively favourable performance came from: Eastern Europe and 
Russia, whose GHG emissions had dropped dramatically after the collapse of 
their economies in the early 1990s; the UK, which, for financial reasons, had 
reconverted its energy supply from coal into gas, entailing substantially 
lower GHG emissions; and Germany, which had modernised the energy-
inefficient production installations in the Eastern part of the country 
following reunification. Other indicators left less room for optimism. By 
2001, the EU, which was responsible for 24 per cent of GHG emissions in 
Annex I countries, had only slightly decreased its net emissions, particularly 
as a result of enhanced mobility, while aggregate stabilisation at the 1990 
level was projected using existing domestic PAMs.28  
Other Annex I parties were also likely to underperform. By 2000, GHG 
emissions had risen by 14 per cent in the US (accounting for 36 per cent of 
Annex I emissions) and 11 per cent in Japan (responsible for 9 per cent). The 
emissions of developing countries, which were formally without emission 
caps, had increased considerably; especially the rapid economic development 
of large countries such as China and India had entailed significant emission 
increases.29 Therefore, while the overall performance by the turn of the 
millennium seemed to be in line with the Protocol’s target, the prospects of 
sharply rising global GHG emissions did not give rise to optimism. 
The Kyoto Protocol enters into force when 55 per cent of the signatories 
representing 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions by Annex I 
countries have ratified it. In late 2003, the first condition had been met (120 
parties had ratified the Protocol), but the second hurdle remained (the 
ratifying parties represented merely 44 per cent of total emissions) because 
the two largest emitters (the US and Russia) had not ratified the agreement.30 
Given the agreement’s outright political rejection in the US in 2001, the 
Protocol could then only enter into force if Russia (responsible for 17 per 
cent of Annex I emissions) ratified it. As the country had postponed this 
decision because of an internal conflict of interests – between those seeking 
                                                 
27 UNFCCC, 2003a. 
28 European Environment Agency, 2003. 
29 China is the world’s second largest producer of GHGs in absolute terms (Leal Arcas, 2001). 
30 UNFCCC, 2003b. Australia, which accounted for 2 per cent of Annex I emissions, had also 
failed to ratify the agreement. 
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to attract foreign energy-efficient investments and those benefiting from the 
sales of fossil fuels – and the desire to capitalise on its pivotal position – by 
inducing the EU and the US to bid against one another, Kyoto’s entry-into-
force had turned into a game of Russian roulette.  
While the US and Russia frustrated the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the EU moved forward by creating the institutional framework to implement 
the Kyoto mechanisms (in particular, emission trading from 2005 onwards). 
It also reiterated its commitment to the Protocol, regardless of its future 
status.31 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development set up an 
investment fund for energy-efficient projects in Eastern Europe and Russia. 
At the end of 2003, the political dispute between the EU, on the one hand, 
and the US and Russia, on the other hand, continued, as a result of which the 
Kyoto Protocol faced a highly uncertain future.  
 
(De)merits 
 
When the institutional embedding, targets, and mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, along with developments since its conclusion, are combined, the 
following strengths and weaknesses of the Kyoto regime can be identified 
against the aim of mitigating the human impact on climate change.32 
 
Strengths 
• Despite the huge divergences of interests, the Kyoto Protocol has been 
signed by virtually all nation states, making it a truly global environmental 
agreement. This creates a broad basis and an important signalling function 
for engaging in climate-related actions around the globe. A broad climate 
coalition is necessary to overcome the problems inherent in a global 
public good such as the climate issue, and paves the way for entering and 
gaining momentum in learning trajectories on emission-poor activities.  
• The Kyoto regime has a solid institutional infrastructure. It is based on the 
UNFCCC, to which all Kyoto signatories (including the US) still formally 
adhere. The IPCC’s extensive and sustained research has considerably 
expanded the knowledge base of climate change. The UNFCCC 
Secretariat effectively coordinates the different positions and monitors the 
performance of countries. Annual COP meetings attended by all parties 
allow for the settlement of unresolved and upcoming issues.  
• Innovative, flexible instruments to reduce the costs of implementation 
have been created. International carbon trade, JI, and the CDM are, at 
least in principle, ways of making the agreement cost-effective by creating 
                                                 
31 Wallström, 2003. 
32 Barrett, 2003; Grubb et al., 1999; Leal Arcas, 2001; Metz and Berk, 2001; Oberthür and Ott, 
1999. 
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international markets where transactions are settled at the least costs. An 
additional benefit of these financial instruments is the monetarisation of 
GHG emissions. This sensitises economic agents to the costs of emissions, 
which is a precondition for taking financially inspired actions. In addition, 
JI and CDM provide opportunities to reinforce international cooperation 
among participating countries. 
• The Kyoto Protocol has specified concrete, binding targets and timetables 
for industrialised countries. This implies that individual commitments 
cannot be waived because of elusive wording.33 While the overall 
reduction target of 5.2 per cent may seem modest, it represents, in the 
context of steadily growing national products, double-digit reductions in 
effective terms; it also implies some decoupling of GHG emissions from 
economic output. 
 
Weaknesses 
• Only a minority of nation states have committed themselves to emission 
ceilings. Some of these states (especially the US and Australia) have 
withdrawn or (as with Russia) have postponed ratification. Apart from 
delaying or obstructing the entry-into-force decision, this leaves a small 
basis for action.34 Besides, the rapidly rising emissions of developing 
countries have remained outside the regulative scope of the Protocol. 
• Even when all parties comply with their targets, the overall level of GHG 
concentrations is hardly affected. Halting the human impact on climate 
requires much more ambitious decreases. Besides, the present targets of 
some countries (for instance, Russia) have been set so low that they 
require no effort to be met, and thus do not lead to the envisaged 
behavioural changes. 
• Kyoto’s enforcement regime is weak. While the penalty of additional 
future reductions in case of underperformance is foreseen, it can easily be 
avoided – especially because future targets (for the post-2012 period) have 
not yet been agreed upon. The present regime is further handicapped by 
the absence of an effective global enforcement organism (such as a 
powerful world environment organisation) or mechanism (such as 
financial or trade sanctions), though national parliaments or NGOs may 
pressurise governments to meet their targets. 
                                                 
33 Vague or ambiguous phrasing is not uncommon in international environmental agreements, 
facilitating their realisation but subsequently entailing interpretation problems that hamper their 
implementation.  
34 While the US has rejected the Kyoto Protocol at the federal level, many local governments 
(states and municipalities) have taken significant climate-related actions. Australia has indicated 
that it aims at complying de facto. 
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  • Carbon trade, JI, CDM, and sinks are waivers to domestic action, because 
parties may comply through accounting measures instead of technical 
actions.35 They distract attention from the sources of GHG emissions and 
discourage behavioural changes and the advancement of climate-neutral 
technology.  
• The time horizon of the first budget period (2008-2012) dissuades 
governments from developing long-term solutions. Parties are induced to 
implement short-term, incremental solutions (such as optimising existing 
techniques), rather than forcing costly breakthrough innovations to realise 
the required leapfrog improvements. 
• The present regime stresses the bearing and sharing of the emission-
reduction burden, rather than indicating novel (economic) opportunities 
that may arise from emission-poor products and processes. 
• Incomplete international participation and differentiated targets entail an 
uneven economic playing field. This especially affects energy-intensive 
businesses which produce in committed countries and sell on highly 
competitive global markets. They are likely to insist on exemption from 
measures. Eventually, they may even relocate to countries with permissive 
climate regimes. 
• The present regime is overly complex. It leads to a high administrative 
load, which certain (developing or emerging) nations cannot or do not 
wish to bear. Besides, complexity facilitates fraud. Bribery of officials is a 
serious risk, especially when stakes are high and opportunities for 
corruption are ample. 
• Economic activities that cannot be easily attributed to national territories 
(in particular, international transport) are not covered by the Protocol, 
though many of these ‘footloose’ activities have a high climate impact. 
 
 
PROSPECTS FOR CLIMATE POLICY 
 
Effective strategies consist of turning strengths into opportunities and 
reducing the threats that weaknesses entail. Public climate policy should aim 
at creating and seizing the opportunities that the Kyoto regime provides, 
while minimising and managing its threats. This is a complex challenge 
because of the numerous intervening variables (such as economic, political, 
technical, and demographic developments), the future directions and 
magnitudes of many of which are uncertain. It is useful to consider different 
                                                 
35 Although the Kyoto Protocol states that international mechanisms are complementary to 
significant domestic action (the supplementarity principle), it fails to specify the minimum share 
of domestically taken measures. 
 
 Architecture of the Kyoto Protocol and Prospects for Public Climate Policy 13 
 
future options, which can be explored using scenarios.36 Scenarios are 
internally consistent, challenging descriptions of possible futures. Their aim 
is not to predict the future, but to sketch and understand feasible alternatives 
in order to be prepared for the contingent situations in which they 
materialise. 
As described in the next sub-section, we developed four such scenarios. 
Government interventions that are compatible with the different scenarios, as 
well as the main actors involved, are reviewed. Finally, we discuss the 
possibilities of raising support for climate policy.  
 
Climate Scenarios 
 
Establishing scenarios involves the identification of future uncertainties 
(given the prevailing policy question), which – after correlated factors are 
merged – yields two critical dimensions. We adopted the key dimensions 
identified by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis,37 which 
show similarities with those of the IPCC and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP).38 The first dimension is the extent of 
international cooperation, ranging from complete national sovereignty to 
full-fledged international cooperation. It indicates the degree to which nation 
states craft their climate policy in concert with other countries. The second 
dimension concerns the allocation of climate-related decisions. In the 
extreme cases, climate policy is entirely organised either by the private sector 
or through public responsibilities (i.e., collective action). Confronting the 
two dimensions yields four scenarios, which are depicted in Figure 23.1. 
 
Local market 
In this scenario, little international cooperation concurs with private-sector 
organisation. The lack of international support may occur if the Kyoto 
Protocol does not enter into force, after which parties that ratified the 
Protocol earlier may no longer feel committed to their initial targets. The 
failure or continued postponement of Kyoto’s entry-into-force may result in 
such a complete loss of momentum. If the Kyoto regime materialises but 
nation states make no effort to meet their targets, international commitment 
will also fall short. Knowing that the Kyoto targets cannot be effectively 
enforced, nation states may indulge in free-rider behaviour and abstain from 
taking measures, especially when these are perceived as costly or untimely 
(for example, when they are to be taken during an economic recession). 
When markets are the locus of decision-making, climate-relevant 
                                                 
36 De Mooij and Tang, 2003; Fahey and Randall, 1998; Van der Heijden, 1996. 
37 De Mooij and Tang, 2003. 
38 IPCC, 2001; UNEP, 2002. 
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behaviour tends to be confined to economically attractive actions: ‘no regret’ 
measures that pay off (for example, higher fuel efficiency leading to lower 
energy costs) and new business opportunities (such as the development and 
 
 
Figure 23.1 Climate policy scenarios 
 
marketing of fuel-cell cars for areas struck by air pollution). Behavioural 
changes that offer no (financial) advantages to individual consumers or 
producers are not undertaken. Given the lack of international cooperation, 
costly measures involving competitive disadvantages for energy-intensive 
businesses exposed to international competition are particularly eschewed. 
 
Local collectivity 
This scenario involves the combination of public responsibilities and low 
international participation. The prevalence of national sovereignty may result 
from pessimism after the collapse of the Kyoto regime or the lack of 
incentives to comply in the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism. 
By contrast, some (EU) countries show a firm political and/or moral 
commitment to the climate cause. The asymmetry between the minority of 
countries that take concerted, possibly costly actions and the majority of 
nations that abstain from collective action leads to political tension. The 
proactive countries may consider the presence of ‘free-riding’ nations to be 
unfair and may experience adverse economic effects of climate-related 
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measures. Industries facing international competition are hampered by the 
uneven playing field. Bilateral agreements among like-minded countries are 
concluded and regional regimes (i.e., political networks of nations with 
similar orientations as to climate policy) are likely to arise in the absence of 
one global regime.39 Such regimes turn the climate issue from a global public 
good into a regional club good: proactive countries collectively shield their 
markets from adverse competition from laggards who do not face measures 
that raise their production costs.40 
Countries may opt for collective actions owing to political awareness (for 
example, because they are directly threatened by the consequences of climate 
change) and/or moral commitment (for instance, because conservation is a 
national value). Generalised local support for far-reaching public measures 
may, for fundamental and/or practical reasons, go together with a call for 
protectionist measures to guard national or regional economies against 
competition from ‘free-riding’ states. 
 
Global market 
In this scenario, many nation states commit themselves to action, which is 
organised through the private sector. This scenario may materialise if and 
when an (amended) Kyoto regime enters into force. One variant is that 
Russia ratifies and the US also joins the Kyoto bandwagon (for example, 
because non-adhesion would be costly to US businesses with international 
operations). Another variant is that the Kyoto Protocol does not enter into 
force, but is renegotiated and accepted with amendments instead. In the latter 
case, the UN Climate Convention is likely to be the basis for constructing 
such a new regime. The main objective of amending the Kyoto regime would 
be to get major ‘missing parties’ on board. In addition to the cooperation of 
Annex I countries that have not ratified the Protocol (especially the US, 
Russia, and Australia), the participation of relatively large and industrialised 
developing countries, which are responsible for significant and increasing 
contributions to GHG emissions, would then be sought. This concerns in 
particular China and India, but also Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South 
Korea. The realisation of such a broad climate coalition is most likely when 
                                                 
39 Restrictive international trade regimes may clash with the rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). While the regulation of environmental protection with trade-distortive 
effects is not forbidden by principle, it is banned when there is a suspicion of protection of local 
industry. As countries with much international trade wish to avoid conflict with the WTO, they 
will be reluctant to adopt trade-distortive measures. 
40 Public goods and club goods share the characteristic of non-rival consumption, but differ as to 
the excludability dimension: producers who do not join the club are excluded (Kölliker, 2002). 
To the extent that certain costs can be shared among the different participators, club goods lead 
to higher utility levels than do public or private goods (Schelling, 1978). It should be noted that 
the nature of goods is not necessarily given by technical characteristics; but it is also shaped by 
human intervention (Kaul et al., 2003). 
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the ambition level of (individualised) targets is relatively low – the more 
easily nation states can comply, the higher their propensity to join – or when 
participation is attractive (for example, because it is related to significant 
CDM projects). Thus, a soft global regime emerges, characterised by a 
multilateral, market-based framework with relaxed targets and/or timetables 
for the present ‘dropouts’, and largely symbolic commitments for the new 
entrants.  
Markets are the main mechanisms to implement a global climate 
agreement. They enable economic agents to settle their commitments in the 
most cost-effective ways. The Kyoto mechanisms lead to the emergence of 
new international markets, where private financial considerations determine 
when, where, and how much is traded and invested. 
 
Global collectivity 
In this scenario, widespread international cooperation, as favoured by the 
EU, takes the form of networks of public arrangements which lead to a high 
level of concerted action at the global level. This regime may arise as a result 
of increased scientific evidence of the negative consequences of climate 
change or the recurrence of high-impact natural catastrophes whose causes 
are attributed to climate change. Nation states pursue significant emission 
reductions, which go far beyond those agreed in the Kyoto framework and 
which may involve considerable financial sacrifice. Yet, there are no 
competitive disparities owing to global participation. Furthermore, parties 
without commitments in the Protocol also assume emission caps. Thus, a 
global regime emerges, which is based on multilateralism. The targets are not 
necessarily phrased in terms of national emission caps; they may also 
concern relative energy efficiency or focus on emission-intensive sectors.  
Actions are initiated and supervised at the central level by a global climate 
organism. Climate policy is regarded as a public responsibility owing to a 
high level of (perceived) awareness of the climate-change problem. 
Therefore, there is general acceptance of the adverse effects on certain 
economic sectors and of measures involving more austere consumption 
practices.  
 
Policy Instruments and Parties 
 
The overall human impact on climate is the product of global population size, 
economic activity per person, the energy intensity of the average economic 
activity, and the carbon intensity of energy supply.41 Considering population 
size and the level of economic activity to be exogenous factors, public policy 
                                                 
41 Holdren, 2003. 
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to mitigate climate change should thus focus on reducing the energy and 
carbon intensities of human activities.  
Climate policy should also be tailored to the characteristics of the 
prevailing scenario.42 When intervening, national governments should take 
into account the specific possibilities and constraints of the scenario that 
materialises. The degree of international participation determines the extent 
to which national commitments can be realised in a global framework. The 
allocation mechanism determines the extent to which climate policy is to be 
implemented through private or public actions. It should be noted, though, 
that a minimal degree of political willingness to take action is required in any 
scenario; if societal actors (in particular, producers and consumers) are not 
sensitive to the climate-change issue, all government policies and 
instruments are powerless. Assuming that societal actors are – or can be 
rendered – sufficiently sensitive, the policy implications for the different 
scenarios are as follows:43  
 
Local market 
In the absence of international cooperation, government has recourse to 
domestic measures. These measures should not be costly to industry because 
of international competition effects. Nor should they interfere with the 
sovereignty of consumers and producers. The most suitable instruments in 
this scenario are national communication, national subsidies for applied 
research and development (R&D) of low-emission technologies, national 
carbon trade, and a national carbon tax. Communicating ‘no regret’ measures 
to producers and consumers involves awareness-raising, and is a way of 
realising both environmental and economic gains. Technology subsidies, 
such as those the Canadian government has granted to develop the hydrogen 
cell, stimulate business to realise low-emission innovations without adversely 
affecting existing competitive positions; they may not only absorb additional 
costs but also stimulate the exploration of new business opportunities. 
National carbon trade allows for cost-effective reductions among domestic 
producers without requiring changes of production modes; non-compliers 
can simply buy off their commitments. Finally, a carbon tax provides 
financial incentives for consumers to adopt lower-emission lifestyles without 
forcing them to change their consumption practices. This instrument does not 
particularly harm domestic producers, as imports are also affected.  
                                                 
42 In this subsection, it is assumed that the climate policies of national governments aim at 
minimising the net national level of GHG emissions. 
43 Future public policy options are discussed in: Aldy et al., 2003; Barrett, 2003; Bodansky, 
2003; Charnovitz, 2003; Den Elzen, 2002; Grubb et al., 2003; Heller and Shukla, 2003; ICCEPT, 
2002; Kemp, 1997; Metz and Berk, 2001; Müller et al., 2003; Pershing and Tudela, 2003; Victor, 
2001. 
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The design and implementation of these policy instruments involve a 
small number of governing parties, in particular, the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and 
the business community of nation states. 
 
Local collectivity 
In a polarised world with divergent climate regimes, proactive national 
policies are crafted unilaterally or in consultation with a small number of 
like-minded countries. Climate policy takes the form of collective action. 
Public policy instruments are national communication, national or regional 
energy-efficiency standards, national or regional covenants (i.e., negotiated 
agreements with industry in which targets are specified in exchange for 
exemption from legislation),44 and national or regional partnerships (i.e., 
voluntary agreements involving business, civil society, and – often – 
government). Communication aims at making the climate-change issue a 
matter of (higher) common concern. Meeting stringent efficiency standards 
forces many producers to restructure the design of their products, during both 
the production phase and the consumption phase.45 Covenants also require 
active industry commitment, as technical measures have to be agreed upon 
that go beyond current practices in order to reduce GHG emissions; in 
contrast to the carbon-trade system, this always requires technical and 
organisational measures. Finally, effective partnerships require the genuine 
willingness and active commitment of different societal actors to engage in 
open discussions and accommodate their behaviour to the outcomes of such 
processes.  
The application of these instruments involves a considerable variety of 
parties: the Ministries of the Environment, Economic Affairs, and Finance of 
a country and/or like-minded nations, national and/or regional business, 
national and/or regional knowledge centres, national and/or regional NGOs, 
and the national and/or regional public at large. 
 
Global market 
The high degree of international participation allows for the international 
implementation of national commitments, which take the form of market-
based actions such as envisaged in the Kyoto Protocol. Suitable policy 
instruments include national communication, participation in global carbon-
                                                 
44 Covenants may include ‘bench-marking’ agreements between government and local industry, 
indicating that local producers will be among the (world’s) most energy-efficient producers in 
their sector in exchange for abstention from legislation. 
45 It should be noted that product standards are easier to control than process standards, as the 
former focus on characteristics of domestically available products, whereas the latter require 
physical controls of (foreign) production sites. 
 
 Architecture of the Kyoto Protocol and Prospects for Public Climate Policy 19 
 
trade schemes, adhesion to a global carbon-tax regime, and contribution to a 
global R&D fund for low-emission technologies. Market-like instruments 
such as JI and CDM are applied to the extent that they are financially 
rewarding. Communication aims at enabling producers and consumers to 
make better decisions. Global carbon trade involves financial exchanges 
among buyers and sellers of hot air on global markets, with the possibility of 
enhancing cost efficiency. A global carbon tax may induce price-sensitive 
consumers to render their purchasing behaviour less carbon intensive, though 
the political feasibility of such a tax may be low. Constituting a global 
research fund enhances the likelihood of realising breakthrough 
technologies; the concomitant economies of scale are important to finance 
the costly R&D in this field. JI and CDM are widely used in this scenario 
because of their cost-effectiveness.  
These instruments require the involvement of national Ministries of the 
Environment, Economic Affairs, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, national and 
international business, as well as supranational administrative and financial 
bodies (such as the UNFCCC Secretariat and the GEF). 
 
Global collectivity 
As this scenario involves the highest level of international cooperation, 
national actions are aligned with those agreed at the global level. They are 
implemented through public actions. Governments intervene through 
national communication and participation in global energy-efficiency 
standards, global covenants with multinational companies, and global 
partnerships. Communication is geared towards informing societal actors 
about our common present and future. Applying stringent global standards to 
energy efficiency in high-impact areas is likely to have a major impact: it 
forces producers to ‘clean up’ their practices and thus creates major 
incentives to engage in R&D and to meet the expected stricter standards of 
future generations. Global covenants with multinationals allow for regulation 
of ‘footloose’ companies which individual national governments cannot 
control because their activities exceed national borders. The same holds for 
global partnerships, in which actors have a greater propensity to take 
voluntary steps. 
This scenario is the most comprehensive one, involving a large number 
and variety of parties: national Ministries of the Environment, Economic 
Affairs, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, national and international business, 
national and international knowledge centres, supranational administrative 
and financial bodies, national and international NGOs, and the public at 
large. 
Table 23.1 summarises the different policy instruments and parties 
involved in the four scenarios.  
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Table 23.1 Instruments and parties in climate policy scenarios 
 
Scenario Policy instrument Party 
Local market Communication 
R&D subsidies 
National carbon trade 
National carbon tax 
Ministry of the Environment 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Ministry of Finance 
National business 
Local 
collectivity 
Communication 
National/regional  
standards 
National/regional  
covenants 
National/regional  
partnerships 
Ministries of the Environment 
Ministries of Economic Affairs 
Ministries of Finance 
National/regional business 
National/reg. knowledge centres 
National/regional NGOs 
National/reg. public at large 
Global market Communication 
Global carbon trade 
Global carbon tax 
Global R&D subsidies 
JI 
CDM 
Ministries of the Environment 
Ministries of Economic Affairs 
Ministries of Finance 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(Inter)national business 
Supranational bodies 
Global 
collectivity 
Communication 
Global standards 
Global covenants 
Global partnerships 
 
 
Ministries of the Environment 
Ministries of Economic Affairs 
Ministries of Finance 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(Inter)national business 
(Inter)national knowledge centres 
Supranational bodies 
(Inter)national NGOs 
Global public at large 
 
Creating Leverage 
 
So far, it was assumed that a minimal willingness-to-act is present in all 
scenarios, though its extent was considered to be exogenously given. We 
next considered the motivation of societal actors to be endogenous, and 
explored ways of enhancing their commitment to climate-relevant measures. 
The literature provides two relevant ways of creating leverage. One way 
(issue linkage) originates in regime theory, while the other (bandwagon 
creation) is rooted in organisational theory (in particular, institutional 
theory). 
 
Linking issues 
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When the climate-change problem is low on the agenda of societal actors, its 
position can be raised by linking it to issues that are perceived as important 
and urgent, provided the different issues are compatible and 
interdependent.46 Issue linkage has the obvious drawback of rendering a 
complex issue even more comprehensive, but has important potential 
advantages. First, when pay-offs exist in several areas, the costs of realising 
them can be shared. Second, connecting issues which are attributed varying 
degrees of importance by different parties provides the opportunity to create 
leverage, because parties commit themselves to acting also on low-priority 
issues that are tied to issues which are given high priority. Third, scope 
enlargement involves more parties, and thus increases possibilities to enlarge 
coalitions. Fourth, linking issues allows solutions to deadlocked problems to 
be sought by widening the scope of topics covered. 
Applied to the present case, Ministries of the Environment should link 
climate policy to issues high on the agendas of societal actors. National 
climate policy may enhance economic competitiveness. Links with economic 
policy can be sought in terms of higher performance at the micro level 
(corporate cost savings resulting from the implementation of energy-efficient 
techniques and new market opportunities emanating from the creation of 
markets for low-emission products)47 and the macro level (the use of climate-
relevant levies for cutting distortionary taxes).48 A double-dividend policy 
can be pursued to realise both environmental and economic benefits.49 This 
linkage strategy would be especially appealing in the local-market scenario, 
where economic factors are important drivers of decisions by private actors.  
National climate policy can also be linked with social issues, such as 
health and safety. For instance, the recurrence of floods in residential areas 
and the death of large numbers of people from extreme temperatures enhance 
the domestic basis for action, not for environmental but for social reasons. In 
these cases, climate policy should not be put forward as a global 
environmental issue, but as a national political priority of an economic and/or 
a social nature. The global and distant nature of the climate issue can also be 
circumvented by tying climate policy to environmental problems which have 
predominantly local and short-term effects (such as air quality). While the 
                                                 
46 Gray, 1999; Gupta and Tol, 2003; Kemfert, 2004; Keohane and Nye, 2001; Kroeze-Gil, 2003; 
Susskind, 1994. 
47 Porter and Van der Linde, 1995. 
48 Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994) discussed the macro-economic advantages resulting from 
using environmental levies to reduce the gap between labour costs and net wages. 
49 The principle of such ‘no regret’ or ‘eco-efficient’ measures is not new (Grubb et al., 1999; 
Hall and Roome, 1996), but has not been sufficiently pushed to overcome behavioural inertia. 
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two are not perfectly congruent,50 benefits in both areas can be realised when 
the consumption of fossil fuels decreases.51 This type of linking may be 
particularly fruitful in the local-collectivity scenario, where social issues are 
the domain of collective action. 
Links can also be established at the international level, whereby Ministries 
of the Environment align their actions with those of the Ministries of Foreign 
and Economic Affairs. Connections can be made with international financial 
assistance and the reduction of trade barriers in exchange for commitments in 
the climate field, especially in the global-market scenario. When bilateral and 
multilateral financial assistance to developing and transition countries are 
made contingent on the climate impact of the recipient projects, economic 
development with a relatively moderate climate impact may be spurred.52 
Likewise, nations may make their support of social issues that other countries 
perceive as important (for instance, security: joint abatement of terrorism or 
assistance in armed conflicts) contingent on collective action in the climate 
field; this is particularly relevant in the global-collectivity scenario. 
Therefore, leverage at the international level can be obtained by stressing 
other (than environmental) benefits of climate policy and by making national 
support in other areas contingent on the performance of counterparts in the 
climate field.  
 
                                                 
50 For example, electric vehicles may lead to better local air quality (as power is generated 
outside the focal area), but may adversely affect climate policy (because of a relatively low 
energy efficiency). 
51 European Environment Agency, 2004. 
52 Similarly, the transfer of best practices and techniques provides both environmental and 
economic benefits. 
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Creating bandwagons 
Bandwagons are diffusion processes whereby innovations are adopted 
because of the sheer number of other participants.53 Once the required critical 
mass has been reached, the number of adopters may rise quasi-
automatically.54 Reasons for adoption include the belief that economic 
opportunities are otherwise foregone and the fear that others perceive non-
adoption negatively. Furthermore, adoption may be a recognition of the 
expertise of the initiators. It may also give rise to economies of scale: high 
adoption rates of standards decrease relative production costs and yield 
positive network externalities, thus reducing the (transaction) costs stemming 
from different standards (such as incompatibility, additional coordination, 
and limited learning effects).55  
The national basis for action in a climate-sceptical country may be raised 
once a participation threshold has been met. Ministries (of the Environment) 
can initiate this process of creating momentum. In the local-market scenario, 
a (temporarily) favourable fiscal treatment of energy-efficient technology 
may lead to a sufficient number of early adopters to trigger a self-reinforcing 
process of diffusion. In the local-collectivity scenario, national champions 
(i.e., highly visible, knowledgeable, and proactive societal actors) may raise 
the collective willingness to engage in socially or environmentally inspired 
actions. 
At the international level, a sufficiently large number of proactive 
countries can induce laggards to join the bandwagon. A high degree of 
international participation is most likely when adhesion is beneficial to 
potential participants. In the global-market scenario, participation in 
international R&D consortia is attractive for companies in order to share the 
high costs of breakthrough innovations, but also to make sure that economic 
opportunities are not foregone because of the lack of access to new 
technologies.56 In the global-collectivity scenario, stringent collective 
technology standards in a sufficiently large group of proactive, wealthy 
countries would induce others to adhere, thus creating a self-enforcing 
international regime.57 For example, if major consumer markets (say, the EU 
plus Japan) can be served only when products meet stringent emission 
requirements, foreign companies and multinationals are forced to adopt the 
                                                 
53 Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993. 
54 DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996. Examples include the expansion of 
supranational organisations such as the UN, the WTO, and the EU. 
55 Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000. 
56 This implies that corporate R&D is turned from a private into a club good: the costs and 
benefits no longer accrue to individual companies but to all who joined the research consortium, 
thus raising the utility levels of participating actors.  
57 Barrett, 2003. Free-riding behaviour is dissuaded, because actors have a personal interest in 
joining the relatively stringent regime; it is a precondition to entering major markets. 
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more stringent standards in order to access these markets, and they may also 
apply them to other markets in order to reap the production and marketing 
economies of scale which stem from having uniform (environmentally 
stringent) product and process standards.58 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have examined the possibilities of conducting an effective future climate 
policy given the characteristics of the present Kyoto regime. When this 
regime was designed, the global-public-good nature of the climate issue had 
to be coped with, requiring the commitment of the global community. A 
diversity of – often conflicting – interests and viewpoints had to be 
reconciled. The ensuing Kyoto Protocol reflected the different desiderata and 
was, therefore, characterised by considerable complexity and ambiguity. It 
was signed by virtually all nation states but committed only a minority of 
them, thus leading to (perceived) moral and competitive disparities. Binding 
targets and timetables were formulated, but the Protocol’s targets were 
insufficient to halt the cumulative process of human-induced climate change 
that had started over a century earlier and the agreement’s time horizon was 
too short; besides, compliance with commitments has faced enforcement 
problems. Innovative, flexible instruments were designed, allowing for cost 
effectiveness to be enhanced and technical measures to be avoided. 
Developments since the Protocol’s conclusion have led to global political 
polarisation: while some parties (especially the EU) have taken political and 
institutional steps towards implementation, others (the US and Australia) 
have formally withdrawn from the agreement or withheld their support (as 
with Russia), thus rendering Kyoto’s global prospects highly uncertain. It 
should be noted, though, that adherence does not guarantee progress and 
withdrawal does not preclude parties from taking climate-relevant (technical) 
actions. Should the Protocol not enter into force, the flexible instruments, 
together with the solid institutional infrastructure, are the elements that are 
most likely to survive the present regime. 
Future climate policy is contingent on a variety of factors, which affect the 
willingness and ability to mitigate the human impact on climate change; 
these include political developments (especially those in large and wealthy 
nation states), evolutions in the field of low-emission technologies, and the 
occurrence and nature of climate-related catastrophes. We explored four 
scenarios of future climate regimes. The local-market scenario may arise if 
the Kyoto regime falls apart. From the perspective of abating human-induced 
                                                 
58 Grubb et al., 1999; Vogel, 1995. 
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climate change, it is the least favourable scenario: the scope of climate-
relevant actions is limited because of national sovereignty and measures are 
mainly confined to those that yield private economic benefits because of the 
dominance of market-based decisions. The global-collectivity scenario, 
involving a high degree of international cooperation and collective allocation 
decisions, may materialise after major natural calamities. This regime is 
relatively favourable, because concerted, politically inspired actions lead to 
stringent standards and sectoral agreements at the global level. The local-
collectivity scenario may occur if a failure of the Kyoto regime leads to 
global bifurcation. In terms of climate impact, it is an intermediate option: a 
small number of countries prescribes relatively stringent measures, but the 
(geographic) scope of these actions is limited; besides, to the extent that 
trade-distortive effects arise, these actions may need to be mitigated to avoid 
economic retaliation by non-participating countries. Finally, the global 
market scenario may be the outcome of a renegotiated or adapted Kyoto 
Protocol. It is also an intermediate regime: the leverage resulting from global 
participation and the realisation of scale economies may lead to important 
progress, though actions are predominantly confined to those that are 
economically rewarding.  
The policy measures that national governments should take are contingent 
on the prevailing climate regime. A local-market scenario calls for local, 
mainly financial policy instruments that do not significantly distort the 
functioning of markets; local producers and consumers retain their 
sovereignty. In a local-collectivity regime, more commanding instruments 
can be applied in concert with like-minded nations, though the (geographic) 
scope of relatively stringent measures is limited and governments operate in 
hostile international environments. International instruments can be applied 
in a global-market regime, though they are, by and large, still compatible 
with market conditions; national climate policies become subordinate to a 
global, mainly financial, (Kyoto-like) regime. Finally, in the global-
collectivity regime, both mandatory and voluntary actions are taken at the 
global level; national policy is an integral part of such measures. In the 
‘minimal’ (local-market) scenario, relatively few actors are affected by 
government interventions. The variety of actors increases as decisions 
become more collective, while the number of parties rises with the degree of 
internationalisation.  
Whichever future regime materialises, public climate policy will have to 
bear in mind what the Kyoto regime has failed to do: to capitalise on the 
incentives of the actors involved. The present stalemate in global public 
climate policy is largely the result of the perception that Kyoto commitments 
involve only burdens and that national compliance cannot be enforced in the 
absence of a powerful global regime. In order to overcome indifference and 
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the temptation to indulge in free-rider behaviour, the incentives of the actors 
concerned should be aligned with the objectives of climate policy. Wherever 
possible, national governments should wield both the stick and the carrot to 
realise changes of production and consumption practices. When the climate 
problem has low political priority, it should be linked to ‘hot’ issues in other 
areas with direct and local pay-offs. Positive results may then stem not from 
climate-inspired actions, but from incentives to realise linked economic, 
social, and environmental objectives: reduced costs, new market 
opportunities, fewer victims of extreme weather events, improved air quality, 
etc. Linkage may help for developing and transition countries to raise 
investment and assistance funds. Connecting climate policy with air policy 
and atmospheric conditions is relevant in many industrialised nations.  
Alternatively, actors may feel compelling incentives to participate. Once a 
critical threshold has been reached (for example, following commitment by 
the EU, Japan, and proactive US states), other private and public actors may 
join the climate bandwagon because they are forced to or do not wish to be 
excluded, thus turning the climate issue from a free-rider-struck public good 
into an incentive-rich club good. Powerful, self-enforcing instruments to do 
so are the prescription of stringent energy-efficiency standards (creating a 
high demand for low-emission technologies) and the establishment of R&D 
consortia (enhancing the likelihood of realising technological 
breakthroughs). When government interventions pay more heed to providing 
the most appropriate incentives, future public climate policies will be more 
effective and levered than the present ones. 
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